The Mughal Siege of Gingee Fort — Conquest of the Madras Karnatak

The Mughal Conquest of Madras Karnatak and Gingee Fort: A Story of Power, Betrayal, and Resistance (1680–1698)

In the late 17th century, the Mughal Empire pushed deep into South India, fighting the Marathas for control of the Madras Karnatak and the legendary Gingee Fort. What followed was 18 years of shifting alliances, siege warfare, political betrayal, and extraordinary military resilience — a story that changed South Indian history forever.

The Divided Land: What Was Madras Karnatak in the 1680s?

To understand the Mughal conquest of Madras Karnatak, we must first understand the land itself. The Madras Karnatak in the late 17th century was not one unified region under one ruler. It was, in fact, a patchwork of competing powers — local chiefs, distant rulers, and ambitious conquerors — all fighting for pieces of a fractured landscape.

The Venetian traveler Niccolò Manucci, who spent decades in India and wrote detailed accounts of the Mughal era, described the Karnatak as split into two distinct halves by the Marakkanam River. To the south lay the Bijapuri Karnatak, stretching down to Porto Novo. To the north was the Haidarabadi Karnatak, running up to Sadras. Further north, the region of Telingana — referred to as the “Gingerlee Country” in old Madras Factory Records — covered the coast from the Krishna River all the way to the Orissa frontier, with its capital at Masulipatam (today’s Machilipatnam).

This geographical division was not just about geography. It reflected a deep political reality: central authority in this region was largely an illusion. Whoever claimed to rule the Karnatak often controlled little more than a few forts and their immediate surroundings.

Payinghat: The Most Unstable Zone

The area called Payinghat — located south and west of the Palar River, from Sadras to Tanjore — was perhaps the most unstable part of the Karnatak in 1689. In theory, it belonged to the Bijapur Sultanate, which had conquered it in the mid-17th century under the Adil Shahi dynasty. In practice, Bijapur’s control was barely real. Semi-independent nobles did as they pleased, and unsubdued poligars — petty local chiefs who controlled the countryside — resisted both Bijapur’s rule and anyone else who tried to impose order.

The region was, in short, a testing ground for the strategies of control, negotiation, and survival in a fragmented political world.

Shivaji’s Invasion Changed Everything

The single most important event that reshaped the Madras Karnatak before the Mughal arrival was Shivaji’s invasion in 1677–78. The Maratha king swept through the region, disrupting Bijapur’s already shaky hold and carving out a new Maratha stronghold centered on Gingee, in what is today the South Arcot district of Tamil Nadu.

But Shivaji’s conquest did not bring peace or order. It fragmented the region further. Some Muslim and Hindu officials of the defeated Bijapuri regime clung to pockets of territory. The Maratha government — now a major regional power — adopted a pragmatic strategy: secure territorial gains through an uneasy truce with the Maharajah of Tanjore and the local poligars, rather than fully subduing them.

The result was a region of armed stalemate, where no single power could fully dominate.

Harji Mahadik: The Viceroy Who Went Rogue

After Shivaji’s death, his son Shambhuji became king and immediately made bold changes. In March 1681, he appointed his sister’s husband, Harji Mahadik, as viceroy of Eastern Karnatak, with Gingee fort as the seat of power. Harji arrived in Gingee along with his lieutenant, Shamji Nayak Pundé. Within five months, Shamji was imprisoned — likely for suspected involvement in palace plots — leaving Harji as the sole ruler of the province.

Harji took full advantage of the opportunity. As Shambhuji became distracted by internal problems — including a controversial advisor named Kavi-kalash and mounting Mughal pressure under Emperor Aurangzeb — Harji stopped sending surplus revenue to the capital at Raigarh. He reportedly began using the title “Maharajah” locally, acting more like an independent king than a loyal viceroy.

The Fall of Bijapur and Rising Mughal Pressure

By September 1686, Bijapur had fallen to Mughal forces — a seismic event that shook the entire Deccan. The Mughal siege of Golkonda began in January 1687. These events alarmed Shambhuji, who sent Kesho Trimbak Pinglé with 12,000 cavalry toward Gingee in October 1686, with secret orders to remove Harji from power and take over as viceroy.

But Harji had allies at court who tipped him off. By the time Kesho arrived near Gingee in February 1687, Harji had fortified the fort and secured the loyalty of the local army. Kesho’s plan had already failed before a single shot was fired. He was forced to pretend loyalty to Harji, and the two men settled into an awkward and hostile coexistence.

HISTORICAL NOTE –The internal rivalry between Harji and Kesho Trimbak was symptomatic of a broader Maratha problem: the empire’s richest and most strategically vital province was being torn apart by personal ambition at precisely the moment when Mughal pressure was greatest.

Golkonda Falls: The Mughals Enter South India

On September 7, 1687, the Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golkonda fell to Aurangzeb’s forces — one of the most consequential military victories of his reign. But the groundwork had been laid months earlier. In July 1687, Mughal officers were already dispatched to seize Golkonda’s provinces. The fort of Kondapalli, one of the strongest in Telangana, was captured through bribery. Mughal raiding parties were already plundering the countryside within three days’ march of Masulipatam.

Aurangzeb now turned his eyes toward the broader Karnatak region — fertile, strategically vital, and rich in trade routes along the Coromandel Coast.

A Smooth Administrative Transition

After Golkonda’s fall, Aurangzeb showed political shrewdness: he kept several former Qutb Shahi officers in their posts to maintain stability. Muhammad Ibrahim, a high-ranking noble who defected to the Mughals, was made governor of Hyderabad with the new title Mahabat Khan. Muhammad Ali Beg, now called Ali Askar Khan, became the military commander of the Karnatak, with Kadapa as his base. By October 1687, these officers had raised the Mughal flag over their forts and sworn allegiance to the emperor.

But Aurangzeb’s trust in former Golkonda officials was short-lived. Worried about their divided loyalties, he replaced them with trusted Mughal officials by January 1688. Mahabat Khan was reassigned to Lahore. Qasim Khan replaced Ali Askar Khan as military commander of the Karnatak, with direct orders to wage war against the Marathas.

1688: A Year of Chaos and Plunder

The year 1688 began with open conflict in the Eastern Karnatak between the Marathas and the newly arrived Mughal forces — but it was less a series of organized battles and more a relentless cycle of raids, plunder, and counter-raids that left the population exhausted and destitute.

The Maratha Raids Begin

A bitter feud erupted between Kesho Trimbak and Harji at the start of the year, as Kesho demanded control of Gingee. To secure a fallback position, Harji retreated to Tevenapatam near Cuddalore. Taking advantage of the lightly defended former Golkonda territories north of the Palar River, Harji dispatched a raiding force under Gopal Pandit and Vital Pillai — 2,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and pioneers carrying scaling ladders — deep into Mughal territory.

The results were devastating. On December 24, 1687, Arcot fell in a brutal assault. Its governor and most defenders were killed. The Marathas swept through the region, plundering towns and driving residents to flee. Prominent Brahmans from Conjeveram (modern Kanchipuram) sought refuge in Madras between December 27, 1687, and January 10, 1688. On January 11, Maratha forces stormed Conjeveram, looting homes and killing around 500 people.

Kesho Trimbak, not to be outdone, launched his own raids. After seizing Chittapet and Kaveripak, he camped in Conjeveram and ravaged the surrounding countryside throughout January 1688. The region descended into lawlessness.

The Mughal Response

Aurangzeb reacted quickly. By mid-December 1687, he had ordered four experienced generals from the former Golkonda administration — Ismail Khan Maka, Yachapa Nayak, Rustam Khan, and Muhammad Sadiq — to march to the Karnatak plains. On February 25, 1688, they arrived in Conjeveram with a force of 4,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry.

The Marathas withdrew rather than face this force, retreating beyond Uttramallur. A tense stalemate followed, lasting nearly a full year. Both armies encamped — the Mughals at Wandiwash, the Marathas at Chittapet, a day’s march to the south — sending out foraging parties that indiscriminately looted the countryside. Trade collapsed. Residents fled to fortified European settlements on the coast. The already devastating famine of 1686 made the suffering even worse.

1689: Maratha Leadership in Crisis

The year 1689 brought no relief. The Karnatak remained a dangerous battleground, roads were unsafe, trade had collapsed, and the English were forced to abandon their factory at Porto Novo in July 1689 due to the impossibility of conducting business in such conditions.

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Then, in February 1689, came a shattering blow to the Maratha cause: Shambhuji was captured by the Mughals. The news reverberated through the Maratha ranks. At Gingee, Harji seized the moment to imprison his rival Kesho Trimbak and his supporters at Trinomali, eliminating the internal threat. But reports of Mughal advances and the mysterious disappearance of Rajaram deeply unsettled him. For a time, Harji considered submitting to the Mughals.

In the end, Harji chose defiance. He focused on fortifying Gingee into an impregnable stronghold. On August 19, 1689, he released Kesho Trimbak — possibly to unify the Maratha effort. But within a month, Harji himself was dead, dying around September 19, 1689.

A New Leader at Gingee

Harji’s widow, Ambika Bai — Shivaji’s own daughter — took charge of Gingee fort and the surrounding province, governing in the name of her minor sons. Her leadership provided continuity in a chaotic moment. But the situation shifted dramatically on November 1 or 2, 1689, when Rajaram arrived at Gingee. His presence transformed the dynamics of power.

Rajaram Takes Charge: A Peaceful Revolution at Gingee

Rajaram’s arrival triggered what historians have called a “peaceful revolution.” Ambika Bai and her Brahman advisors — who had governed Gingee with considerable autonomy for over eight years — were reluctant to give up their authority. But Rajaram’s legitimate claim to leadership was undeniable, and the transition of power proceeded without bloodshed.

Kesho Trimbak, Rajaram’s chief ally, moved quickly to consolidate his position. On November 15, he confined Harji’s son and extracted a heavy financial settlement — three lakhs of hun — from Ambika Bai in exchange for her continued security. Another key figure, Santaji Bhonslé, was similarly compelled to pay one lakh.

Rajaram’s Strategic Vision

Rajaram wasted no time in organizing his administration and rallying support. He summoned all significant officials to appear before him at Gingee. His broader strategy was ambitious: divert Mughal forces away from his homeland in Pune, forge alliances with Hindu Nayaks across South India, and ultimately reclaim the kingdoms of Golkonda and Bijapur from Mughal control.

To strengthen his government, he created a new supreme position — Pratinidhi, or Regent — and appointed Prahlad Niraji to fill it. Nilo Moreshwar Pinglé retained the title of Peshwa as nominal prime minister. Locally, Timaji (son of Kesho Trimbak Pinglé) was appointed administrator of the Gingee district, while Sundar Balaji took charge of Kunimedu.

KEY APPOINTMENT –The appointment of Prahlad Niraji as Regent introduced a darker dynamic into Rajaram’s court. Contemporary accounts describe him as manipulative — allegedly keeping the young king in a state of intoxication through ganja and opium, and using that influence to effectively control the government himself while forcing wealthy Brahmans to surrender their fortunes.

Squeezing the Europeans: Maratha Financial Desperation

By late 1689, the Maratha administration at Gingee was facing a severe financial crisis. Unable to sustain itself from the already-plundered rural population, it turned to the prosperous European trading settlements along the East Coast.

In early December 1689, the administrator of Gingee demanded a “loan” of 3,000 hun from the English factory at Kunimedu, with similar demands made to the French and Dutch factories. Wealthy Indian merchants were pressed for sums as high as 5,000 hun each. By late December, the demands escalated — an additional 5,000 hun was demanded from each European company as a “fine” for their buildings and fortifications.

The Sale of Tevenapatam Fort

With their coffers still empty, the Marathas made a remarkable decision: they offered to sell the fort of Tevenapatam (later Fort St. David) and surrounding land to the European companies. The French, offered the fort for 50,000 hun, declined wisely. The English negotiated shrewdly, reducing the price to 51,500 chakram — equivalent to roughly Rs. 1,08,150. In August 1690, Rajaram signed a farman (royal order) transferring the fort and its land to the English East India Company.

But the deal was compromised almost immediately by Maratha duplicity. A dispute arose over a village called Manikupam, with the Dutch claiming rights under an older farman and the Marathas backing that claim in order to extract more money from the English. The English governor Elihu Yale bitterly noted that the “mercenary Marathas” would resell the same fort multiple times to the highest bidder.

The European Rivalry at Rajaram’s Court

The Dutch, fierce rivals of the French, actively worked to have Rajaram expel the French from Pondicherry. They repeatedly bribed Maratha ministers for an order of expulsion. The Maratha ministers played both sides to maximize their gains. In June 1690, the French outmaneuvered the Dutch by lending Rajaram 6,000 chakram at 18% interest — a move that secured French goodwill at court and blocked the Dutch scheme, at least for the moment.

Gingee Fort: The Impregnable Rock Fortress

To understand why the siege of Gingee lasted eight years, you need to understand the fortress itself. Gingee is not merely a single fort — it is a complex of three fortified hilltops united by massive walls of circumvallation. From its position on the Karnatak plain, it commands the entire landscape from Arcot in the north to Trichinopoly in the south, and from the Eastern Ghats to the Bay of Bengal.

The three hills — Rajgiri (the western peak), Krishnagiri (the northern hill), and Chandrayandurg (the southern peak) — form a rough triangle with a perimeter of nearly three miles. Each hill rises steeply from the plain, covered in enormous boulders that make climbing nearly impossible without knowing the paths. The builders transformed these natural barriers into an integrated fortress system of remarkable complexity.

Engineering Built for Defence

Each hill was fortified on all sides with multiple tiers of stone walls, rising one above the other. These walls contained gun platforms for artillery, loopholes for musketeers, and narrow heavily defended gateways. Connecting the three citadels was a stone rampart nearly 60 feet thick, protected by an outer ditch more than 80 feet wide. The three-mile-long triangular enclosure formed the lower fort, while the three hills served as individual inner citadels.

Access to each citadel from the lower fort was provided by steep granite staircases carved from and between the massive boulders littering the hillsides — paths that were both functional and essentially impossible to assault in force.

Rajgiri: The Crown Jewel

The highest and strongest of the three peaks is Rajgiri, rising 800 feet above the plain with a near-vertical ascent of 400 feet above the surrounding ridge. The only path to its summit passes through three successive lines of loopholed walls before reaching a massive natural rock formation whose top nearly reaches the level of the citadel.

At the summit lies the fortress’s most brilliant defensive feature: a great natural chasm, roughly 24 feet wide and 50 feet deep, separating the final rock from the topmost terrace of the citadel. The former builders — agents of the Vijayanagar empire — artificially widened and deepened this chasm. The only entrance crosses it via a narrow wooden bridge. The military historian Orme observed that this single point could be held by ten men against ten thousand attackers.

The Three Gates

Three main gates provided access to the fortress complex. The northern entrance, known today as the Vellore or Arcot gate, was called the “gate towards Tiruvannamalai” in the 17th century. The eastern Pondicherry gate served as the principal entrance during that era. A small postern gate on the western face, known to Indians as Shaitan-dari (Devil’s Gate) and marked on French maps as “Port du Diable,” would play a crucial role in the long siege — it could never be fully blockaded, allowing the garrison to receive supplies at will.

1690: The Campaign Begins in Earnest

The year 1690 opened badly for the Mughal forces in the Karnatak. The arrival of Rajaram at Gingee in late 1689 had energized Maratha activities. Almost simultaneously, a rebellion broke out among the former Golkonda officials who had recently been absorbed into Mughal service. Muhammad Sadiq was angry about his removal from local command. Yachapa Nayak and Ismail Maka realized that the lavish promises made to them during the annexation of Golkonda were not going to be honored. Frustrated, they defected to Rajaram and began seizing territory and collecting revenue across the region.

The Mughal representatives scattered from Madras to Kunimedu were completely overwhelmed in numbers, suffering defeats and forced to seek shelter in European settlements. The governor, Askar Ali Khan, had to send his family to Madras for safety in April.

Zulfiqar Khan Arrives

This rebellion only ended with the arrival of Zulfiqar Khan, appointed as supreme Mughal commander. He had been dispatched from the imperial court at Korégaon at the end of November 1689, traveling through Reichur, Karnul, Nandiyal, Kadapa, and Garamkonda before descending into the Karnatak plain around June 1690. Along the way, he fought battles and captured numerous forts. By August, he reached Conjeveram. By early September, he was in the environs of Gingee.

Rajaram had dispatched his own troops — along with forces from his allies the king of Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yachapa Nayak — to block Zulfiqar’s advance into the eastern plains. But the sheer reputation of the approaching Mughal commander proved too intimidating, and the Marathas retreated without achieving anything.

The Siege of Gingee Begins: September 1690

Zulfiqar Khan arrived before the fortress of Gingee in early September 1690, fresh from Aurangzeb’s court with imperial orders to capture the Maratha stronghold. He gazed upon the three interconnected hilltop citadels — and immediately grasped the magnitude of the task ahead. He sat down before the fortress, which was itself a sign of how daunting the challenge was.

He lacked the heavy artillery and sufficient ammunition needed for a serious bombardment of Gingee’s stone walls. By September 19, he was already sending urgent requests to the English at Madras — first for 200 maunds of powder and 500 soldiers, then escalating within days to 500 maunds of powder, 500 cannon balls, 500 soldiers, and 30 skilled European gunners.

European Mercenaries Join the Siege

The English responded by sending 200 maunds of powder and 3,800 iron shot. By November, Zulfiqar was also pressing the French agent in his camp for European munitions and gunners. High pay offers proved irresistible to many European soldiers of various nationalities who abandoned their original allegiances to join the Mughal siege army. Through these efforts, Zulfiqar assembled an elite corps of 100 European soldiers, bringing specialist military knowledge to bear against Gingee’s defenses.

By April 1691: Size Without Progress

By April 1691, the Mughal camp before Gingee had grown enormous. Observers throughout the surrounding region expected the fortress to fall quickly. The sheer size of the besieging force and its apparent readiness suggested imminent victory for the empire. Yet the siege had made virtually no progress. Gingee’s garrison moved freely, receiving supplies and harassing the besiegers. The Marathas were recovering from their initial shock and had begun to fight back relentlessly.

Maratha Reinforcements and Mughal Decline

In November 1690, three prominent Maratha chiefs — Nimaji Sindhia, Mankoji Pandhré, and Navoji Mané — abandoned the Mughal cause in western India and arrived at Gingee with 2,000 horsemen. They took charge of the crucial defense works at Chakrakulam in the lower fort.

February 1691 brought another critical moment: Rajaram himself returned to Gingee. He had hoped to build a grand alliance of Hindu princes along the East Coast, envisioning a confederacy that could challenge Mughal power across Golkonda and Bijapur. But the bitter mutual rivalries among local chieftains made this impossible. Only one reliable ally emerged: his first cousin, the Rajah of Tanjore, who provided continuous support in men, money, and provisions throughout the siege — motivated partly by family loyalty and partly by territorial concessions.

The Siege Turns Against the Mughals

After April 1691, the Mughal military position began to erode rapidly. Maratha cavalry operating in the surrounding countryside effectively cut the grain supply lines to Zulfiqar’s camp. Many Deccani soldiers who had initially supported the imperial campaign began deserting to the Maratha side. Temporary relief came when Sayyid Lashkar Khan arrived with money from Aurangzeb and grain from the Kadapa district, but it was not enough.

Zulfiqar was reduced to sending increasingly desperate reports to the Emperor, explaining that enemy forces were surrounding him, cutting off supplies, and that without reinforcements, disaster was approaching.

Imperial Family Drama

Aurangzeb’s response was to summon Asad Khan — Zulfiqar’s own father and the empire’s prime minister — to hasten to his son’s aid. Asad Khan had been campaigning south of the Krishna River since November 1690, based at Kadapa. Prince Kam Bakhsh, stationed at Wagingera, was also ordered on July 20, 1691, to proceed to the Karnatak and provide support.

But Asad Khan’s behavior baffled everyone. Despite having often boasted that he would show what a “Turk” could accomplish in battle, he now displayed remarkable lethargy when his own son was in crisis. When the Emperor received reports of his inactivity, Aurangzeb reportedly turned to his librarian in frustration and they recited together a cutting verse: “Don’t brag again — your boast has come to an end!” This rebuke was written directly into a dispatch sent to the tardy prime minister.

It worked. Asad Khan began moving. Prince Kam Bakhsh reached Kadapa on October 4, and the combined force arrived at Gingee on December 16, 1691.

1692: Massive Reinforcements, Zero Results

Despite the arrival of Asad Khan, Prince Kam Bakhsh, and further reinforcements, 1692 proved equally fruitless for the imperial forces. The three hills of Gingee remained as defiant as ever.

Zulfiqar established his headquarters opposite the eastern Pondicherry gate, near a hillock called Alki Madad. Asad Khan and Prince Kam Bakhsh encamped three miles away, beyond the northern gate. Each Mughal camp was carefully walled around for protection — a telling sign that the besiegers felt deeply insecure despite their numbers.

The Persistent Supply Problem

One of the most frustrating aspects of the siege remained the garrison’s ability to maintain supply lines. The Shaitandari gate — the “Devil’s Gate” — could not be effectively blockaded. Garrison troops moved freely through it, coming and going at will and bringing in provisions whenever needed. An outpost was placed under Kakar Khan to watch the Vetavalam forest path through which many supplies reached the fortress, but this surveillance proved inadequate.

Maratha Tactical Brilliance

The defenders of Gingee fort showed remarkable creativity throughout 1692. Maratha forces regularly launched sorties from Krishnagiri using rocket fire to threaten Prince Kam Bakhsh’s camp — an early example of rocket warfare. In one particularly dramatic operation, a force 9,000 strong sallied out of the northern gate in a massive nighttime assault. Although repelled by the entire Mughal army, the attack was so dangerous that it prompted a complete reorganization of the imperial camps. Zulfiqar moved the prince’s camp to his own side and joined the two encampments within shared protective walls.

The Assault on Chandrayandurg

With his reorganized forces, Zulfiqar chose Chandrayandurg — the southern hill of the fortress — as his focused target. Siege trenches were dug toward it, and Zulfiqar launched a dual bombardment targeting both Chandrayandurg and the main Pondicherry gate. Artillery thundered day and night. To distant observers, the fortress seemed about to fall. But those closer to the action understood the truth — these operations were largely for show.

Monsoon Misery

The monsoon of 1692 fell with exceptional severity. Grain prices soared. Soldiers spent days and nights in waterlogged trenches. The entire region transformed into what looked like one vast lake. While the Marathas remained secure on their well-drained hilltops, the imperial forces struggled in flooded camps, their siege works repeatedly submerged under sheets of rain. An eyewitness account from 1692 described soldiers “required to spend days and nights continuously in the trenches” under these impossible conditions.

The Tide Turns — 30,000 Maratha Cavalry Arrive

The decisive moment came in December 1692, when more than 30,000 Maratha horsemen — raised in western India by Ramchandra, Rajaram’s chief agent — arrived in the Eastern Karnatak under two of the most celebrated Maratha generals: Dhana Singh Jadav and Santa Ghorparé.

This was a strategic masterstroke. The arrival of these experienced commanders with fresh troops broke the stalemate that had persisted for over two years.

The Disaster at Conjeveram

Santa Ghorparé’s division struck first. The approach of the Maratha cavalry inspired such terror that inhabitants from across the Conjeveram district fled to Madras, seeking shelter behind English walls between December 11 and 13. Ali Mardan Khan, the Mughal military commander of Conjeveram, made a fatal miscalculation — he rode out to encounter what he assumed was a manageable enemy force. Instead, he walked into a carefully prepared trap.

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During the battle, his corps of bahelia musketeers suddenly switched sides and joined the Marathas. Finding resistance futile, Ali Mardan attempted to retreat to Conjeveram but was completely surrounded. The outcome was total: he was captured along with 1,500 horses and six elephants. His army’s equipment was looted on December 13. He was transported as a prisoner to Gingee, and his brother-in-law later paid the enormous ransom of one lakh of hun to secure his release.

Ismail Khan Trapped in the West

Simultaneously, Dhana Jadav’s division assaulted the siege trenches on Gingee’s western side. Recognizing the impossible situation, Zulfiqar ordered all scattered outposts to fall back and consolidate. Most commanders managed to withdraw safely. But Ismail Khan — the former Golkonda grandee who had joined the Mughal cause — was posted west of the fort with a much longer escape route. His soldiers became dispersed while trying to evacuate their belongings. The Marathas, coordinating brilliantly with allies inside the fortress, intercepted his retreat. Despite fighting against overwhelming odds — roughly ten to one — Ismail Khan was wounded and captured along with 500 horses and two elephants.

The Besiegers Become the Besieged

The revival of Maratha dominance in the countryside had immediate consequences for the Mughal siege. The grain supply to the imperial camp via Poonamalai and Madras — which had been free and plentiful since the siege began — was completely cut off. Even more critically, all correspondence between Aurangzeb’s court and the siege camp ceased entirely, creating a communications blackout with catastrophic results.

The Mughal army that had come to besiege Gingee now found itself surrounded and in extreme peril. The besiegers had become the besieged.

Prince Kam Bakhsh: A Spoiled Child of Empire

The external military disaster was compounded by an internal political crisis of the first order. Prince Kam Bakhsh — described by the court historian as “a foolish young man, the spoilt child of his father’s old age, untaught to bridle his passions” — had already alienated his guardian Asad Khan through petty provocations. During the march from Kadapa to Gingee, the prince had traveled on horseback, stopping to hunt and sightsee along the way, forcing the elderly Asad Khan to keep up despite his infirmity. Malicious courtiers on both sides deliberately inflamed the quarrel.

After arriving at Gingee fort , Kam Bakhsh went further: he opened secret correspondence with Rajaram himself — a treasonous act that could have meant execution. The Marathas, delighted to have a contact inside the enemy camp, flattered the prince’s vanity while encouraging him toward even more dangerous schemes. Zulfiqar, who was paying a thousand rupees daily to spies inside the fortress, discovered the secret negotiations. With imperial authorization, he placed the prince under strict surveillance, monitored by his most trusted lieutenant Dalpat Rao.

The Midnight Escape Plot

Terrible rumors circulated — including the false report that Aurangzeb had died and Shah Alam had already taken the throne in Delhi. For Kam Bakhsh, trapped and isolated, this was paralyzing. If his father was dead, both Asad Khan and Zulfiqar would deliver him to any new emperor in chains. Panicking, the prince’s servants convinced him that his only hope was to escape in the night to Gingee with his family, then seek Maratha help to claim the throne of Delhi — as his brother Akbar had once tried to do.

One night, the prince assembled his elephants and palanquins for a clandestine departure. But the plot was discovered at the critical moment. Asad Khan received warning and assembled his forces in opposition. Faced with potential armed conflict with his own guardian, the prince lost his nerve and sent his retinue away, postponing the plan — though the danger remained.

The Desperate Retreat: Abandoning the Siege

Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan convened an emergency council with senior officers. The verdict was unanimous: the prince must be strictly guarded, the siege trenches abandoned immediately, and all forces concentrated in a defensive position around Asad Khan. After more than two years of costly siege operations, the Mughal Empire was admitting defeat at Gingee.

Destroying the Great Guns

Knowing the Marathas would exploit the moment of retreat, Zulfiqar took a drastic step: he deliberately destroyed his heavy artillery by overloading the guns with excessive powder charges, then abandoned the ruined weapons on the field rather than allow them to fall into Maratha hands. The destruction of his own siege guns was one of the most dramatic admissions of failure in Mughal military history.

Fighting Through the Gauntlet

As Zulfiqar’s forces withdrew from the trenches in compact formation — with the main camp four miles behind them and the fort walls just half a mile ahead — the Marathas struck in devastating coordination. The garrison poured out of Gingee to join Dhana Jadav’s forces outside. The retreating Mughals were caught between hammer and anvil.

In desperation, Zulfiqar launched a counter-attack directly toward the fort gate, driving his war elephant at the Marathas positioned there. Caught off guard, they fled back within the walls and shut the gate, abandoning roughly a thousand infantry who were cut down in the melee. The retreating Marathas also left behind about a thousand horses. By the end of the chaotic engagement, reported Maratha casualties were around 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry — though such numbers from this period should always be treated cautiously. Imperial losses were reported at 400 soldiers, 400 horses, and 8 elephants, with most wounds caused by Maratha artillery.

The Arrest of a Prince

While Zulfiqar had been fighting for his life, Prince Kam Bakhsh was exulting in his tent, planning to arrest both Asad Khan and Zulfiqar at their next visit and seize command of the army. This fantasy was immediately uncovered by the spy network. Exhausted from the day’s fighting and furious at this new betrayal, Zulfiqar and Asad Khan reached a fateful decision: they would arrest the emperor’s son.

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The operation unfolded with military precision. Both commanders rode their elephants through the canvas wall of the prince’s compound and knocked down the screens of his audience hall — a deliberate act of disrespect. The prince’s servants discharged bullets and arrows in futile resistance. Faced with overwhelming force, Kam Bakhsh emerged from his quarters and advanced only a few steps before Asad Khan’s musketeers seized both his arms. Dalpat Rao lifted the prince onto his elephant and transported him to Asad Khan.

Asad Khan’s fury was extraordinary. He called the prince “a dancing-girl’s son” — a devastating insult questioning his very legitimacy — and declared him “unworthy to rule over men or to command in war.” Paradoxically, the news of the prince’s arrest was met with celebration throughout the Mughal camp. As the historian Bhimsen wrote, “life came back to our bodies.” The treacherous element had been removed, and unity was restored to forces that had been on the edge of disintegration.

The battered army withdrew to Wandiwash, where it rested for four months from February through May 1693 — a complete abandonment of the Gingee siege, at least for the present.

Aurangzeb’s Measured Response and Imperial Recovery

The officers at Wandiwash waited in terror for Aurangzeb’s reaction to the unprecedented arrest of his favorite son. Rumors circulated wildly — one claimed that Asad Khan had poisoned himself rather than face disgrace. The emperor’s actual response, when it came, was careful and calculated. He ordered the prince brought to him under Asad Khan’s guard, and issued no immediate orders regarding Zulfiqar and his officers — a silence that left their fate hanging for agonizing weeks.

When the wazir Asad Khan reached Sagar on his journey to court, Aurangzeb ordered him to halt there and send Prince Kam Bakhsh alone. The prince arrived on June 11, presented to his father in the private family quarters through the intercession of his sister Zinat-un-nisa. This careful staging — using a trusted daughter as intermediary and keeping the meeting away from public court — revealed Aurangzeb’s desire to handle the crisis as a family matter, not a public scandal.

The prince tried to shift blame onto Zulfiqar, accusing him of deliberate collusion with the Marathas to prolong the siege for personal profit. Aurangzeb, with his decades of military experience, recognized the desperate self-justification of a failed young man and gave it no credence.

Restoring Authority in the Karnatak

Meanwhile, Zulfiqar used reinforcements brought by Qasim Khan to reassert Mughal authority across the region and replenish his treasury. The retreat from Gingee fort had been a signal for numerous local chiefs throughout the Karnatak to rise in rebellion — plundering grain convoys bound for the imperial camp and seizing forts for themselves. Zulfiqar methodically punished these rebels, extracted substantial fines, and returned to Wandiwash with both his authority and finances restored.

The Three-Way Struggle: Who Controlled the Eastern Karnatak?

By 1693, the Eastern Karnatak had become extraordinarily complex politically. Three distinct categories of power competed in often violent conflict:

• Group 1The old Hindu local chieftains and former Vijayanagar viceroys whom the Bijapur and Golkonda sultans had never fully subdued — claimants to legitimacy based on centuries of local dominance.
• Group 2Officers of the recently overthrown Bijapur and Golkonda governments, reluctant to recognize their new Mughal overlords and clinging to old loyalties.
• Group 3The Maratha forces of Rajaram and Vyankoji — conquerors seeking to carve out permanent territory from the chaos of imperial transition.

Yachapa Nayak: A Study in Shifting Loyalties

No individual better illustrated the volatile nature of allegiances in this period than Yachapa Nayak. His family had obtained the strategic fort of Satgarh — 26 miles west of Vellore — from ministers of the Warangal kingdom long ago, claiming ancient Rajput heritage. The Qutb Shahi government had recognized his position as commander of local levies. After Golkonda fell, he initially resisted the Mughal conquest, then accepted imperial inducements and switched sides, then revolted again and joined Rajaram at Gingee, then abandoned Rajaram to fight for his own independent interests — and finally, by the end of 1693, was won back by Zulfiqar Khan with a prestigious military rank and a rich land grant worth 3 lakhs of hun in the Karnatak.

His multiple switches of allegiance were not exceptional for the time. They were the norm.

Maratha Expansion in 1693: The Empire Strikes Back

The temporary collapse of Mughal power at the start of 1693 gave the Marathas golden opportunities to expand influence across South India. Santaji Ghorparé besieged Trichinopoly in March. Rajaram arrived shortly after the siege began, lending his royal presence to the campaign. On April 10, the Nayak of Trichinopoly made peace with the Maratha king — a major diplomatic triumph that established Maratha influence in one of South India’s most commercially significant cities.

Following this success, Rajaram traveled to Tanjore in May 1693 to visit his first cousin Shahji II — a strategic conference between two allied rulers who were actively reshaping the political map of South India.

But success brought its own fractures. A serious quarrel erupted between Santaji Ghorparé and his rivals in the Maratha leadership over the post of commander-in-chief. Santaji’s notoriously difficult temperament finally proved too much for his colleagues, and he left for Maharashtra in anger. Dhanaji Jadav was appointed Senapati in his place — a significant shift in military leadership at a critical moment.

The 1694 Tanjore Campaign: Correcting the Strategic Error

Zulfiqar Khan had made one fundamental strategic mistake when he first besieged Gingee: he had rushed to attack the fortress without securing control of the surrounding countryside. This had left his army perpetually vulnerable in hostile territory, unable to protect supply lines or coordinate effectively. In February 1694, strengthened by the adhesion of local leaders including Yachapa Nayak, he launched a systematic campaign to correct this error.

Capturing the South Arcot District

The campaign began with the dramatic storming of Perumukkal fort — perched on a steep hill 300 feet above the plain, 18 miles north of Pondicherry. Dalpat Rao’s Bundela warriors stormed it under Zulfiqar’s direct observation, sending a clear message to other regional strongholds. Following this victory, Zulfiqar made a personal journey to the ocean — the first time in his life he had seen the sea — before launching a methodical advance down the East Coast toward Tanjore, capturing numerous forts and establishing Mughal control across the South Arcot district.

Tanjore Submits

When Zulfiqar arrived near Tanjore in March 1694, Maharajah Shahji II faced an impossible situation. He had been Rajaram’s most consistent ally. Now resistance seemed futile — Shahji’s traditional enemy, the Nayak of Trichinopoly, had joined the Mughals and was actively encouraging the imperial army to recover territories Tanjore had previously seized from him.

On May 22, 1694, Shahji II signed a comprehensive letter of submission. The terms were severe: Tanjore would pay an annual tribute of 30 lakhs of rupees — 20 lakhs payable immediately in cash, jewels, and elephants, the remaining 10 lakhs the following year. He surrendered the strategically important forts of Palamkota, Sittanur, and Tunganur, along with multiple other territories that had been mortgaged to him by Rajaram. Most critically for the siege of Gingee, Shahji agreed to cease all assistance to Rajaram — including the supply of provisions smuggled into the fortress through the Vetavalam forest.

The Shocking Execution of Yachapa Nayak

In September 1694, Zulfiqar suddenly arrested Yachapa Nayak during a formal court audience, accusing him of treason with the emperor’s prior authorization, and had him immediately beheaded. This shocking execution of a local chieftain who had switched sides multiple times sent a chilling message to regional leaders about the price of betraying Mughal trust. Contemporary sources report that members of Yachapa’s family who were present at the time killed themselves rather than face capture, and his property was looted by the camp.

A General’s Secret Alliance: Zulfiqar Khan’s Betrayal

By the close of 1694, a remarkable and damning truth had become common knowledge throughout the region: Zulfiqar Khan was not genuinely trying to capture Gingee. He had entered into a secret alliance with the very Marathas he was supposed to be conquering.

The evidence came from multiple independent sources. François Martin, the founder of Pondicherry, maintained close contact with Rajaram’s court and stated in his letters and memoirs that Zulfiqar “had, during the course and particularly at the end of the siege of Gingee fort, an understanding with Rajaram.” Martin’s analysis of the general’s motivation was precise: Zulfiqar, anticipating the death of the elderly Aurangzeb and the civil wars that would inevitably follow among his sons, had conceived the ambition of creating an independent principality for himself — and for that he needed Maratha goodwill.

The English merchants of Madras reached the same conclusion independently, recording on November 5, 1696: “Zulfiqar Khan has been frequently ordered to take Gingee, and it has been in his power to do so and destroy all the Marathas in the country. But instead of that it appears plain that he hath joined council with them.”

Even Bhimsen — who served as the right-hand man to Dalpat Rao, Zulfiqar’s own most trusted lieutenant — could not conceal his commander’s treachery, writing: “If he had wished it, he could have captured the fort on the very day that he reached Gingee.”

The Charade Continues

In October 1694, Zulfiqar marched out of Wandiwash and established camp north of Changam fort, 42 miles west of Gingee fort. What followed perfectly illustrated his secret arrangement with the Marathas — a carefully choreographed dance of mutual non-confrontation. The Marathas made daily incursions into his camp, carrying off horses. The Mughal cavalry harassed and plundered the surrounding countryside. Both sides maintained the appearance of warfare while carefully avoiding any decisive engagement.

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By 1695, internal conflicts within the command structure were becoming acute. Serious disagreements erupted between Zulfiqar and his chief officers — Daud Khan Pani, Kishore Singh Hada, and Dalpat Rao — who may have been more genuinely loyal to the empire than to their compromised commander. One particularly revealing incident involved reports that ten camels loaded with imperial rupees had been sent by Zulfiqar to Rajaram as direct financial support. Daud Khan reportedly intercepted this treasure convoy.

By April 1695, Sarafraz Khan — one of Zulfiqar’s chief officers — quarreled openly with his commander and marched away to the imperial court without permission, an act of outright insubordination that revealed the complete breakdown of discipline. Court newsletters began reporting additional desertions as other officers chose loyalty to the empire over complicity in the general’s treasonous strategy.

1695–1697: Years of Futility and Maratha Revival

The year 1695 passed without any meaningful Mughal achievement. A severe grain shortage raged throughout the year, intensifying the misery of already-demoralized soldiers. Zulfiqar laid siege to Vellore in October 1695 — perhaps hoping that success at a secondary target would distract from his failures at Gingee. But even this more modest objective held out not just for months, but for years.

December 1695: The Storm Returns

In early December 1695, alarming reports reached the Mughal forces: a large Maratha army of 15,000 men under the dreaded Santa Ghorparé and Dhana Singh Jadav was marching toward the Eastern Karnatak. These commanders had already defeated Qasim Khan, the Mughal governor of Mysore. Imperial officers began preparing to flee; many sent their families to the safety of Madras. The great Mughal war machine had been reduced to an army whose commanders planned retreat before their enemies had even arrived.

The Marathas arrived near Vellore at the end of December 1695. Zulfiqar immediately abandoned the siege entirely, sending his family and baggage to Arcot. Throughout 1696, Santa Ghorparé and Dhana Jadav operated across multiple regions simultaneously, creating security crises faster than the Mughals could respond. Stretched to breaking point, Zulfiqar wisely concentrated his forces at Arcot — but this meant ceding effective control of large areas to the Marathas.

Financial Collapse

Throughout 1696, Zulfiqar received no financial supply from the Emperor — a situation that left him unable to pay his troops, purchase supplies, or maintain basic logistical infrastructure. In desperation, he approached the English merchants of Madras with an extraordinary request: a loan of one lakh of hun, in exchange for which he offered to mortgage any part of the Karnatak under his control to the East India Company. The English, displaying commercial prudence, refused repeatedly. By October 1696, Zulfiqar’s frustration led him to threaten an attack on Madras itself — an extraordinary deterioration in Mughal diplomatic relations with the European trading companies.

The Illusion of Warfare

With Zulfiqar confined to Arcot and the main Maratha forces operating in the surrounding countryside, an extraordinary spectacle developed. Contemporary sources described it directly: “the Marathas, as usual, hovered round him, there being a secret understanding between the two sides to spare each other.” Both sides maintained the appearance of hostility while ensuring no genuine damage was done to either.

1697: Maratha Civil War Opens a Window

Fortune finally offered the imperial cause an opening — not through Mughal strategy, but through Maratha internal conflict. A bitter rupture erupted between Dhana Singh Jadav and Santa Ghorparé, the two most effective Maratha generals, over the position of commander-in-chief. This was not a personal quarrel but a fundamental conflict over strategy and leadership that had been building for years. When Rajaram sided with Dhana Singh, the conflict escalated into what sources describe as an “internecine war.” In May 1697, Dhana was decisively defeated by Santaji and driven back to Maharashtra — removing one of the most successful Maratha commanders from the South Indian theater at a crucial moment.

The broader impact was severe. Contemporary observers noted that “among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every one called himself a sardar and went out to plunder on his own account.” The coordinated resistance that had made the Maratha cause so effective dissolved into factional raiding.

Rajaram’s Peace Overture

The financial pressures on the Maratha side were equally severe. In August 1697, Rajaram made an extraordinary diplomatic gesture: he sent his natural son Karna to Zulfiqar Khan through the mediation of Ram Singh Hada, offering to negotiate peace. The very fact that Rajaram would send his own son as an emissary demonstrated his desperation and his recognition that the stalemate was unsustainable for both sides.

Aurangzeb’s response was uncompromising. He rejected any peace terms and issued direct orders to Zulfiqar Khan to capture Gingee without further delay — a command that left no room for the kind of strategic evasion that had characterized the general’s conduct for years. In mid-October 1697, Zulfiqar sent Karna back to his father, ending the brief diplomatic interlude. The siege would have to reach a military conclusion.

The Fall of Gingee: November 1697 to January 1698

In early November 1697, Zulfiqar Khan finally renewed the siege of Gingee fort — this time, as contemporary sources put it, “in right earnest.” The phrase implicitly acknowledged that previous siege operations had been something less than genuine attempts to capture the fortress.

The Final Deployment

The deployment of imperial forces for the final assault reflected careful planning and eight years of hard-won experience. Zulfiqar positioned himself opposite the northern gate toward Singhavaram hill. Ram Singh Hada was stationed west of the fort, facing the Shaitandari postern gate — the “Devil’s Gate” that had allowed the garrison to maintain supply lines throughout the siege. Daud Khan Pani was assigned the challenging task of assaulting Chikkali-durg, located a mile south of the main fortress complex, despite lacking artillery and proper siege equipment.

Chikkali-durg Falls in a Day

Daud Khan’s assault on Chikkali-durg demonstrated what determined imperial forces could achieve when actually trying. Despite his lack of proper siege equipment, he captured the stronghold in a single day through what sources describe as “a reckless assault at close quarters.” This rapid success provided crucial momentum. After securing Chikkali-durg, Daud Khan immediately moved his division to entrench opposite Chandrayandurg, the southern component of the three-hill complex.

The Last Act of Betrayal

Even now, Zulfiqar Khan could not fully abandon his treacherous arrangement. Contemporary sources state that “if Zulfiqar had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day” — but his secret policy remained focused on prolonging the siege for personal benefit. Most scandalously, he “let the Marathas know that his attacks were for show only, and that he would give Rajaram sufficient notice to escape before he captured the fort.”

For two additional months, this sham warfare continued. But the combination of imperial pressure from Delhi, growing anger from subordinate officers, and the impossibility of sustaining the deception indefinitely finally forced Zulfiqar’s hand.

Rajaram Escapes

True to his secret arrangement, Zulfiqar warned Rajaram of the impending genuine assault. The Maratha king escaped to Vellore with his chief officers — forced to leave his family behind in the fortress. Only after ensuring Rajaram’s safe departure did Zulfiqar give the order for the actual assault on Gingee fort.

The Brilliant Tactical Deception

The final assault showcased sophisticated military planning. While Daud Khan noisily explored potential scaling routes up Chandrayandurg from the south — drawing the garrison’s attention and defensive resources to that sector — the real assault was being prepared elsewhere. Dalpat Rao, demonstrating the courage and skill that had made him legendary, scaled the northern walls of Krishnagiri and captured the outer fort after severe fighting. His Bundela warriors followed the retreating garrison so closely that they entered the inner fortification called Kalakot virtually alongside the defenders, occupying it immediately.

The surviving Marathas retreated to Rajgiri, the highest and strongest of the three forts. But this only delayed the inevitable.

Chandrayandurg and the City Fall

Meanwhile, Daud Khan fought his way into Chandrayandurg and advanced through the city in the lower plain of Gingee fort toward Krishnagiri. Civilians fled toward the heights of Krishnagiri, but finding no genuine security there, they surrendered. The imperial forces secured an enormous amount of booty — horses, camels, and material goods — as organized Maratha resistance collapsed.

The Final Surrender of Rajgiri

Rajaram’s family was now trapped in Rajgiri, the highest point in the entire fortress complex. Dalpat Rao controlled the gate of Kalakot. Zulfiqar held the main entrance to Rajgiri. Ram Singh Hada had made his way to the summit of Rajgiri itself — crossing the famous chasm via the narrow wooden bridge that Orme had once described as defensible by ten men against ten thousand. The position was hopeless.

Rajaram’s family chose negotiated surrender. Four wives, three sons, and two daughters of Rajaram emerged and were placed in what sources describe as “honourable captivity.” But one of his wives refused. In a final act of defiance that would be remembered long after the military details were forgotten, she flung herself from the summit of the fortress into the depths below, her body caught in a tree on the inaccessible hillside — a haunting symbol of Maratha resistance carried to its ultimate end.

What Was Found Inside

The capture of Gingee fort revealed the scale of the community that had sustained the eight-year defense. Nearly 4,000 men, women, and children were found within the fortress complex, though very few were actual combatants. This was the civilian foundation of the long resistance — artisans, suppliers, servants, and family members whose labor and sacrifice had enabled a small military garrison to defy the Mughal Empire for nearly a decade.

Zulfiqar personally supervised the collection and secure storage of all property and war materials. He ordered the execution of many Maratha officers who had fought against imperial forces throughout the siege. The damaged fort walls were repaired, all foot-tracks and scaling routes used during the assault were sealed, and the fortress was stocked with rockets and gunpowder manufactured at St. Thome to defend against any Maratha attempt to recapture it.

The Bird Had Flown: What Gingee’s Fall Really Meant

From Gingee fort , Zulfiqar returned to Wandiwash before launching a pursuit of Rajaram. The Maratha king had fled from Vellore to Garamkonda, attempting to establish a new center of resistance. But he had enough of a head start to reach the safety of Vishalgarh in February, successfully evading capture and preserving the leadership that would be essential for the continuation of Maratha resistance.

The successful capture of Gingee fort was a major military achievement — one that had eluded imperial forces for eight costly years. But the escape of Rajaram meant that, as one contemporary assessment put it: “the entire work of the Emperor’s long siege of Gingee fort was undone. The bird had flown away.”

Key Events: Timeline of the Mughal Conquest

• 1677–78 –Shivaji invades the Madras Karnatak, captures Gingee fort, and establishes Maratha power in Eastern Karnatak.
• 1681 –Shambhuji appoints Harji Mahadik as Viceroy of Eastern Karnatak. Harji increasingly acts as an independent ruler.
• Sept 1686 –Bijapur falls to Mughal forces — a seismic event reshaping the entire Deccan.
• Sept 1687 –Golkonda falls. Aurangzeb’s forces now control the entire Deccan Sultanate territory.
• 1688 –Maratha raiding parties devastate Conjeveram and Arcot. Mughal and Maratha armies reach a bloody stalemate.
• Feb 1689 –Shambhuji captured by the Mughals. Harji imprisons his rival Kesho Trimbak.
• Sept 1689 –Harji Mahadik dies. His widow Ambika Bai governs from Gingee  fort.
• Nov 1689 –Rajaram arrives at Gingee fort. Maratha resistance is reorganized under his leadership.
• Sept 1690 –Zulfiqar Khan arrives before Gingee fort. The eight-year siege begins.
• Dec 1692 –30,000 Maratha cavalry under Dhana Jadav and Santa Ghorparé arrive. The besiegers become the besieged.
• Early 1693 –Zulfiqar retreats from Gingee, destroying his own guns. Prince Kam Bakhsh is arrested.
• May 1694 –Tanjore submits to Mughal authority. Rajaram’s primary supply line is cut.
• Nov 1697 –Zulfiqar renews the genuine siege of Gingee fort after years of deliberate delay.
• Jan 1698 –Gingee fort falls. Rajaram escapes to Vellore and eventually reaches Vishalgarh.

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