Haidar Ali and the Second Anglo-Mysore War: Complete History
The treaty signed on 3 April 1769 stipulated the mutual restitution of prisoners and places, and that should either contracting party be attacked, both would mutually assist each other, from their respective countries, to drive out the enemy. This clause mattered greatly, for the British in later years undeniably broke faith, and the next war with Haidar was the fruit of their refusal to fulfil their obligations.
The Second Mysore War is, from the British point of view, a tedious record of disaster. The Marathas had for some time been contemplating one of their periodic raids on Mysore, and toward the close of 1769 Madoo Rao set out from Poona. Haidar, retreating before him along the woody tract skirting Bednore, sought protection in his capital in January 1770. Though he repeatedly called on the English, as bound by treaty, to help repel the invasion, his demands were persistently evaded, to the discredit of the Madras Government. The Marathas attacked Mysore in 1771, and the war lasted until June 1772, when Haidar, severely handled at Chercolee, purchased peace with a large payment and the cession of a great portion of his dominions — the direct fruit of the English breach of the 1769 treaty.
Since the British refused to honour the treaty and gave Haidar no support, his territories were overrun by the Marathas, and he was forced to buy peace with them for thirty-six lakhs of rupees and an annual tribute. This angered Haidar Ali, who came to hate the British. When the French later attacked Mahe, a French possession within Haidar’s dominion, he declared war on the English in 1780.
Up to 1780, when Haidar again made war on the English, he was again at war with the Marathas, with rather more success than in the preceding campaign. Between 1769 and 1779 he made repeated efforts — going so far as to offer the provinces of Baramahal, Salem, and Attur, together with twenty lakhs of rupees, as the price of an understanding with the British — but their persistent refusal drove him into the arms of the Marathas.
When the English made known their designs on Mahe, a port in Malabar where Haidar’s authority was generally established and which he regarded the foreign settlements there as dependencies of his own, he made the consequences of such action clear beyond any doubt, and the war of 1780, though long premeditated on his part and in any case probably inevitable, was precipitated by the capture of Mahe.
Mahe was captured in March 1779. Haidar’s resentment was so plain that the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Rumbold, sent the missionary Christian Friedrich Schwartz to appease him. Haidar treated Schwartz with great respect, but nothing was gained beyond unequivocal evidence of his hostility.
Haidar’s Attacks on Arcot, Conjeevaram, and Other Places
For many months Haidar prepared for war on the largest scale, and in July 1780 burst into the Carnatic through the Chengam Pass, advancing toward Madras and laying siege to Arcot. The main body of the English army, under Commander-in-Chief Sir Hector Munro, advanced to its relief, while the brigade sent to take possession of the Guntur Circar, under Colonel Baillie, was hastily recalled and directed to join the Commander-in-Chief.
There followed the dreadful disaster of Baillie’s force being destroyed on 10 September, barely two miles from Sir Hector Munro’s own position, and the subsequent precipitate retreat of the army to Madras.
Haidar’s army, on setting out from his capital in June 1780, numbered ninety thousand effectives, twenty-eight thousand of them cavalry. He moved slowly at first, taking the Nawab’s forts in the Carnatic piecemeal, by force or intrigue, and it was not until 21 August that he invested Arcot.
He resolved to interpose a desert between himself and his enemies: the whole country from Pulicat as far south as Pondicherry, between thirty and fifty miles inland, was given up to fire and sword, and a similar zone thirteen miles on every side was drawn round Vellore.
Edmund Burke, in his speech on the Nawab of Arcot’s debts, described this episode memorably. Haidar, he said, had grown so confident in his strength, and so assured in his might, that he made no secret of his terrible resolve. Having settled his disputes with every rival, all of whom buried their mutual animosities in a common detestation of the English, he gathered from every quarter whatever savage ferocity could add to his methods of destruction, and, compounding fury, havoc, and desolation into a single dark cloud, hung for a while on the slopes of the mountains. While the authors of these evils idly watched the gathering storm blacken their horizon, it suddenly burst and poured down upon the plains of the Carnatic.
What followed was a scene of misery unlike anything witnessed before. Every horror of war previously known was mercy compared to this new devastation. A storm of fire blasted every field, consumed every house, and destroyed every temple. The wretched inhabitants, fleeing their burning villages, were in part slaughtered; others, without regard to sex, age, rank, or sacred office, were torn from children and spouses and swept into captivity amid a whirlwind of cavalry and the goading spears of drivers. Those who evaded this tempest fled to the walled cities, only to escape fire and sword for the jaws of famine.
Black columns of smoke were visible from St. Thomas’ Mount on every side before any step was taken to oppose the invader. Colonel Baillie, then commanding in Guntur, Colonel Brathwaite in Pondicherry, and Colonel Cosby in Trichinopoly were ordered immediately to converge on the Presidency. The Commander-in-Chief was Sir Hector Munro, though it was first proposed to give the command to Lord Macleod, a King’s officer recently arrived with his regiment, so as to retain Munro at the Council table, where his vote was needed for the Governor’s majority. Lord Macleod proposed Madras as the point of concentration; Sir Hector favoured Conjeevaram, and, rather than yield the point, took the command himself, his absence at Council being offset by the arbitrary appointment of an additional Councillor certain to vote with the Governor.
On 24 August, before Sir Hector Munro made his first march from the Mount toward Conjeevaram, forty-two miles distant, Colonel Baillie had reached Gummadipundi, twenty-five miles north of Madras. The Chief had five thousand two hundred and nine men, and Baillie two thousand eight hundred and thirteen; united, the force — with a large proportion of European troops — would have formed a formidable column of over eight thousand men. The Chief, however, marched on, ordering Baillie to join him at Conjeevaram by way of Tripassur and Perambakam, a march of over fifty miles.
Haidar, whose spies kept him informed of everything, at once determined to exploit this initial error. He moved off from Arcot suddenly and took up an entrenched position at Musarvakam, a village about six miles west of Conjeevaram.
On 25 August, Colonel Baillie reached the north bank of the Cortelliar nearly opposite Perambakam, about fourteen miles north-west of Conjeevaram. The river, though dry at the time, was liable to rise suddenly with rain in the mountains — and did so that very night, detaining the British force on the north bank until 4 September, when it crossed to find Tipu, with a picked force of six thousand horse, five thousand foot, six heavy guns, and a large contingent of irregulars, preparing for the attack.
Colonel Baillie, seeing this, took up ground at Perambakam, and an indecisive engagement lasting three hours took place on the 6th. As a result the British commander wrote to Sir Hector at Conjeevaram asking him to march to his aid, while Tipu sent to his father for reinforcements, without which he said he could not succeed.
On the day this action was fought, Haidar had moved from his entrenched camp so as to command the road by which such a junction must be made. Sir Hector, by contrast, remained inactive at Conjeevaram on the 6th, 7th, and 8th. He eventually detached Colonel Fletcher with the flank companies of his army — two companies of the 73rd Foot (Highlanders), two companies of European Grenadiers, and two of sepoy marksmen — to reinforce Colonel Baillie. This move, which further divided his already-divided forces, succeeded better than it deserved: although the guides meant to lead Fletcher to Perambakam were in Haidar’s pay, Fletcher reached the place by suddenly ordering them onto an unfrequented route, and Baillie was able to set out from Perambakam on the night of the 9th with an augmented detachment of three thousand seven hundred and twenty men.
For the first five or six miles the enemy’s opposition amounted to harassment with rockets and irregulars, but it soon grew more serious. Discipline and steadiness prevailed, and the attacks of an enemy who had used every nullah and channel to throw up temporary works were repeatedly repulsed. The force might yet have reached Conjeevaram had not Baillie, disregarding Fletcher’s warnings, taken the fatal decision to halt for the night. The morning of the 10th brought disaster, as Haidar’s whole army was seen advancing under distant cannonade.
The British force found itself in a defile studded with palmyra trees, under the full force of a cross-fire from fifty guns. For a time the detachment’s ten cannon replied with some effect, but the explosion of two ammunition tumbrils in the middle of the hollow square caused such panic that Colonel Baillie, most of his Europeans wounded like himself, saw further resistance was hopeless. Forming the miserable remnant of his men into a square on a slight rise, and repelling thirteen attacks over the next hour and a half, he finally went forward waving his handkerchief to ask for quarter.
He was taken prisoner, but before Haidar’s orders could be issued, some shots fired in panic by sepoys gave Haidar’s young soldiers the excuse to fall upon the wreck of the British force and commit the most barbarous atrocities — exhibiting their swordsmanship, as one account records, on men already inhumanly mangled, on the sick and wounded in the dhoolies, and even on women and children.
The few who escaped were saved by French officers in Haidar’s service, especially M. Pimorin and M. Lally — brother of the officer who had besieged Madras — though those they saved were only reserved to languish and die in confinement at Seringapatam.
Sir Hector, meanwhile, hearing the cannonade, had advanced to within two miles of Pullalur, where the disaster took place; but, by his own account, he returned to Conjeevaram once the firing suddenly ceased, having concluded that Baillie must have driven off the enemy and would be able to reach Conjeevaram unassisted.
This was by far the greatest disaster ever to befall British arms in India. Sir Hector Munro, panic-stricken, threw his guns and heavy baggage into the great tank of the Siva Pagoda and retreated during the night of the 11th to Chingleput, harassed the whole way by the enemy’s cavalry and losing much of his remaining baggage.
At Chingleput, as at Conjeevaram, he found none of the stores the Nawab had promised, but was joined by Colonel Cosby and an important detachment. After hesitating between taking ship from Sadras to reach Fort St. George by sea, he finally marched via St. Thomas’ Mount, which he reached without serious mishap, though his retreat was dogged by swarms of irregular horse. He finally entrenched himself on the banks of the Adyar river.
Haidar returned to Musarvakam, which he called his “fortunate encampment,” but left it on 19 September to take Arcot, which the Nawab had partially fortified in the meantime. He did so by assault after a six-week siege.
British Counter-Offensive, 1780
The Governor-General removed Mr. Whitehill, the incompetent Governor of Madras, appointed Mr. Smith, the senior Councillor, in his place, and sent Sir Eyre Coote south to take command of the troops. This energetic response, made amid a panic that threatened the Company’s very existence in the south, produced good results. Besides other strongholds, Haidar had taken Karanguli, and Chingleput was also under investment.
As soon as the news reached Calcutta, Sir Eyre Coote was despatched to Madras, arriving on 5 November, but found the army so wretchedly equipped that he could not take the field until 17 January 1781. Meanwhile Haidar had captured Arcot and laid siege to Wandiwash and four other forts. Wandiwash was successfully defended by Lieutenant Flint and a brother officer with such romantic valour and skill that the siege became one of the most honourable episodes of the war. Soon after, Sir Eyre Coote captured Karanguli, and on 20 January marched toward Cuddalore.
Two days after relieving Chingleput, Coote turned his attention to the improved works of Karanguli fort; on the 20th, Captain Davis was sent with a thousand men to retake it. Though the intelligence that the enemy were evacuating proved false, Davis’s orders to reduce it were peremptory, and after blowing open the gates he captured the place, not without considerable loss. The large stock of provisions found there was a valuable acquisition, but the chief benefit was the improved morale it instilled in the army, which took the success as the first instalment of better fortune.
Sir Eyre Coote’s operations over the following six months were in South Arcot, including the relief of Wandiwash, culminating in his victory over Haidar at Porto Novo on 1 July 1781.
The Battle of Porto Novo and Its Importance
During 1781, having captured Karanguli, Sir Eyre Coote marched toward Cuddalore on 20 January, reached Pondicherry in early February, and on the 6th of that month Haidar’s army appeared in sight, also marching toward Cuddalore. Two battalions were sent at once to secure the passage of the Ariankupam river, and the army marched that same afternoon.
The two armies followed different roads only a mile apart. The enemy kept up a cannonade all night, with little effect, and at daybreak the English army reached Cuddalore. A French fleet lay off Pondicherry at this time, and Haidar negotiated with its commander, but on his refusal to accede to demands for money, the squadron sailed away on the 7th — relieving Coote of anxiety over his scarce provisions and allowing him to obtain supplies by sea. On the 8th he offered Haidar battle, which Haidar declined, drawing off southward.
For five months the army remained at Cuddalore, during which time Haidar recovered Tiagur. During its siege, Sir Eyre Coote moved toward its relief in late May but, after reaching Trivadi and camping there for two days, returned to Cuddalore. Reinforcements sent overland from Bengal after news of Baillie’s disaster reached Calcutta had by now entered the Carnatic, and to draw off Haidar’s attention Sir Eyre Coote marched southward on 16 June, reaching Chidambaram two days later, where a large fortified pagoda adjoined a substantial pettah enclosed by a mud wall, garrisoned by two to three thousand Poligars. That evening the General sent three battalions to attack the pettah; the enemy, after a scattered fire, retreated into the pagoda. By some mistake, and without orders, the foremost battalion pursued them to the gates and, finding them shut, brought up a twelve-pounder. The second shot burst open the outer gate. In the haste of loading, a mishap occurred, and Captain Moorhouse of the Artillery loaded and discharged the gun twice by means of a musket, breaching the second gate wide enough for one man at a time.
The sepoys crowded into the space between the two gateways, unaware of a flight of steps midway leading to the rampart. The garrison, dreading assault, called for quarter, but their voices were lost in the ensuing tumult when some straw caught fire and set alight the clothes of the crowded sepoys; in the resulting crush to escape both suffocation and enemy fire, many were burned to death, and those who escaped fled without bringing off the twelve-pounder. Six officers and nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.
The General, then in the pettah, ordered cannon brought up to batter the wall; a fine brass eighteen-pounder was ruined without making any breach, and as day broke the troops returned to camp. All thought of taking the place by assault was abandoned, and since the army had no battering guns, it was resolved to send for them from Cuddalore and, after removing the rice from the pettah, proceed to Porto Novo to cover their landing.
The army marched to Porto Novo on the 22nd. On the 24th, Sir Edward Hughes arrived with the battering train, and while rafts were being prepared to carry it up the Coleroon, the Mysorean army appeared in sight of Porto Novo. Haidar had been preparing to besiege Trichinopoly when the commandant at Chidambaram sent word of having beaten off the English and forced their retreat to Porto Novo.
He marched seventy miles in two days, reaching Motapolliam, four miles west of Porto Novo, on the night of the 27th. Shortly before daybreak on 1 July, Sir Eyre Coote drew up his army on a large plain between the two camps. On his right was a chain of sand-hills running along the coast about a mile from the sea; in the rear and on the left, woods and enclosures with an open space between; two miles to the left ran another parallel chain of sand-hills, behind which lay the bulk of the Mysorean army. At eight o’clock the enemy opened fire from eight guns in two batteries raised among the sand banks, though too distant to do much damage.
The General, having reconnoitred their position, saw that they hoped he would advance across the plain under the fire of batteries raised on every side, so their cavalry could exploit the impression made by the guns; he therefore made no change to his dispositions, holding his ground and offering battle until eleven o’clock, when, seeing they would not attack, he moved to the rear of the sand-hills on his right.
The army marched in two lines, the first under General Munro, the second under General Stuart. The first contained all the European infantry with six battalions of sepoys divided equally on the flanks; the second, four battalions of sepoys. Half the cavalry formed on the right of the first line, the rest on the left of the second. The baggage, guarded by a regiment of horse and a battalion of sepoys, remained on the beach near Porto Novo.
After marching a mile between the sand bank and the seashore, the army again passed through an opening into the plain where the enemy’s artillery and infantry stood waiting, their cavalry still behind the sand-hills. Within an hour the whole first line had entered the plain and formed up under fire from forty pieces of cannon; not a shot was returned, the guns not even unlimbered, and everything proceeded as though the army meant only to continue its march.
The enemy, encouraged and believing this signalled an intention to escape, brought their artillery closer, and every shot now told. The General rode along the front urging patience, waiting for word from the second line. When an aide from General Stuart reported that he had taken possession of the sand-hills, Coote at once ordered an advance and a general cannonade. The artillerymen, long restrained, now exerted themselves to such effect that nothing could stand before their fire. The Mysorean infantry managed only a single discharge before the gun crews hurried their pieces away, while the cavalry’s charges were broken before reaching the line every time.
Within a quarter of an hour the whole enemy force was scattered. While the first line engaged Haidar, the second was attacked by Tipu and Lally, repulsed in every attempt by General Stuart to dislodge him from the sand-hills; when Haidar fled, they followed. A deep watercourse saved the enemy from pursuit. The English army numbered seven thousand five hundred fighting men; a Portuguese captain who deserted to the English during the action, and claimed to have seen the returns, said Haidar had had three to four hundred thousand men — certainly their numbers were so great that not all could have been brought into action at once.
Significance of the Battle of Porto Novo
The Battle of Porto Novo was among the most critical ever fought in India. Had the English army been broken and forced to retreat, it would very likely have been entirely destroyed by the vast cavalry surrounding it, and the whole Carnatic would have lain at Haidar’s mercy. It later became known that Haidar had given orders to take no prisoners.
Decisive Attacks by the British Forces under Sir Eyre Coote
After the battle at Porto Novo, in which Haidar was completely defeated, to his own considerable surprise, the siege of Wandiwash — resumed some days earlier by Tipu, who had surrounded it with a complete line of circumvallation — was already under battery when a message arrived from Haidar announcing his defeat and directing Tipu to storm the fort at once by escalade, then hasten to intercept a British contingent arriving overland from Bengal.
Lieutenant Flint learned that the assault was planned for the night of 16 July. Fully prepared, he opened a deadly fire of grape upon the enemy as soon as their approach was heard. A tumultuous noise followed the discharge, gradually fading into silence. Further attempts were made that night and the next day, but all failed alike, and the demoralised condition of the army grew so alarming that Tipu struck camp and marched to cut off the Bengal detachment — only to miss it by advancing along a route it did not take, and to learn, further disappointed, that a junction with Coote had already been achieved.
Coote had earnestly hoped this welcome reinforcement would come with an even more welcome supply of draught cattle, but was disappointed, and it still seemed almost impossible to achieve the relief of Vellore or to undertake the siege of Arcot, the two great objectives before him. With great effort an advance was made to Tirupassur, which was taken. Haidar retired to Pullalur, the scene of his annihilation of Baillie’s force, intending to bring on an engagement on the eleventh day of Ramzan, a date that had proved so auspicious for him the previous year; it fell that year on 31 August, though the battle actually took place four days earlier, resulting in a somewhat inconclusive victory for the English.
Coote remained hard-pressed for transport and provisions. Reports arrived, however, that plenty prevailed in the territories of the Chittoor Poligars and the Zemindars of Karvetnagar, Kalahastri, and Venkatagiri. The followers of the first two zemindars had joined the invaders, while the lancers of Venkatagiri served with the British army; but as Haidar’s prospects grew more doubtful, his local allies sent assurances to the English camp that their support for the enemy had been forced upon them by their defenceless position — probably true — and all promised assistance should the British army move into their territories.
Sir Eyre Coote accordingly marched to Tirutani, in the Karvetnagar Zemindari, and reduced the small fort of Polur nearby, though his numerous foraging parties met with only indifferent success elsewhere. Coote’s difficulties were compounded by an urgent appeal for relief from Colonel Lang, commanding at Vellore, who warned that surrender was inevitable unless supplies reached the fort soon. Almost simultaneously, news arrived that Haidar was at Sholinghur, fortifying a position to block any advance toward Vellore.
Sir Eyre Coote resolved to force a general battle, and on 26 September the army marched seven miles toward the enemy, leaving a small garrison at Polur with the heavy guns and unnecessary equipment. That night torrents of rain fell, making it nearly impossible to strike the tents. Haidar, aware of this, concluded Coote would not move on the 27th, and let his draught cattle stray in search of pasture while many of his troops dispersed for supplies.
Early on the 27th, Coote, riding out to examine the country, unexpectedly came upon an advanced portion of the enemy on a long ridge of rocks. A brigade was called up and the enemy dislodged; from the ridge, Haidar’s camp was clearly visible some three miles to the south. The whole army was got into motion with the least possible delay and moved into position for an attack on the Mysore camp.
The country, as later described, was comparatively open, but ridges and groups of rocks, irregularly scattered and rising to unequal heights, allowed each side to exploit the ground. Haidar’s main force was judiciously drawn up behind the crest of a long, non-rocky ridge, its front covered by swampy rice fields, his guns placed along the ridge or on commanding points among the advanced groups of rocks. Beyond the corps already in position, several detached bodies exceeding the entire English army in numerical strength were seen moving toward each flank, and large masses of cavalry gathered at various points, evidently ready to charge on signal. The whole British movement had, in fact, come as a surprise to Haidar, who from the outset despaired of success and hoped only to save his guns, resolving for that purpose to sacrifice his cavalry.
The English advance over broken ground naturally broke the continuity of their line at times, and, seizing on such gaps, two large squadrons of enemy horse charged. Both were met, as they advanced, with volleys of grape from Coote’s artillery, and, on reaching the English lines, with a destructive cross-fire of musketry from troops who, in defiling, had fallen back at an angle to the main line, affording excellent protection to the attacked flanks. One charge was directly repelled and rode back in confusion; the other broke through the ranks, pursued by volleys from the rear rank, which had faced about for the purpose.
Though these charges failed, they gave Haidar time to limber up and remove his guns, and the whole Mysore army was soon in rapid retreat, leaving only one gun for the English to capture. Coote’s losses in the battle did not exceed a hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy’s losses were reckoned at upwards of five thousand.
The distress of Vellore grew daily more critical. Though the Zemindars of Kalahastri and Karvetnagar, after Haidar’s defeat at Sholinghur, deserted his cause with profuse promises of assistance, Coote found it impossible to obtain more than a scanty daily subsistence within their territories. Rumours, however, held that large convoys of grain were passing at intervals down the Kallur Ghat to the Mysore army, and, hoping to intercept one, a detachment under Colonel Owen was sent some distance west. This officer was attacked among the rocky hills south-east of Chittoor by nearly the whole Mysore army under Haidar in person, but managed, at the cost of all his baggage, to extricate himself. Coote soon joined him, and by early November a small surplus of grain had been collected from the Chittoor Palaiyams, allowing Coote on the 3rd to provision Vellore for six weeks. Operations against this fort, defended by Colonel Ross Lang, had continued almost without pause since the campaign began, when a large detachment under one Mir Sahib had been sent against the place and batteries erected.
Sir Eyre Coote’s advance from Madras around this time led Haidar to withdraw most of his troops from Vellore, and the siege was thereafter converted into a blockade. Provisions grew so scarce that grain sold at only two seers a rupee, at a time when money itself was far less plentiful than it later became. Scanty supplies were brought in from the Chittoor Poligars by Mahommed Murad and his horsemen; redoubts were also built and mounted with guns near the paddy lands close to the fort, and the ryots were encouraged to cultivate.
During the blockade, Colonel Lang resolved to create a diversion by attacking the hill fort of Kylasadrug, some six miles from Vellore. The pettah was carried by a night attack, and the hill ascended, with siege laid to the drug. At daybreak, however, the enemy received considerable reinforcements from Virinjipuram, and Colonel Lang suffered an utter defeat, his party pursued in confusion down the hill with thirty men killed and forty wounded in the retreat.
The enemy then made the blockade still more complete, intimidating the local people by cutting off the noses of anyone caught carrying provisions to the garrison and driving them, thus mutilated, into the famine-stricken town. After provisioning Vellore on 3 November, Coote advanced to Chittoor and reduced its small fort, thought important as a supposed depot for provisions; it capitulated on 11 November after four days’ defence, though the intelligence about its importance proved false. The only consequence of its capture was that the General further weakened his army by leaving a battalion in garrison, later sacrificed when the army withdrew. The garrison left at Polur had also been forced to evacuate that fort, and on 13 November news arrived of a reverse at Pallipat, near Sholinghur, where another battalion, in charge of the sick and wounded, was driven — it was suspected through the treachery of the Karvetnagar Zemindar — to retire into the jungle with the loss of its cannon and stores of grain.
With the rains daily expected, it was now time to return to cantonments near Madras. Though greatly weakened in health and disheartened by his army’s wretched equipment, Sir Eyre Coote yielded to the Madras Government’s urgent request to withdraw his resignation, and on 2 January 1782 once again joined the army. Three days later, camped near Tirupassur, he was found senseless in his tent from an attack of apoplexy. His life was spared, and by the next day he had recovered enough to accompany his troops in a palanquin. The march was to Vellore, again in extremity.
On the 9th the army prepared to cross the dry bed of the Poiny river, some two miles from its confluence with the Palar, when the enemy appeared and made a show of opposing the crossing; Coote’s caution and skill were such that Haidar abandoned the attempt. On the 10th, two strong enemy columns again appeared and opened distant cannonade as the army advanced across wet paddy fields, but Haidar was powerless to check Coote’s progress.
On the 11th the convoy reached Vellore, and three months’ provisions were passed into the fort. Colonel Lang rejoined Coote’s army, and the defence of Vellore fell to Captain John Cuppage. On the 13th the army retraced its steps and was again opposed near the swampy ground where the attack of the 10th had occurred; the heavy ground was crossed with little loss, and a determined attack drove Haidar’s forces back, pursuing them until nightfall. The march to Tirupassur was marked only by a few empty demonstrations from the enemy.
It is notable that throughout 1781, though Coote was within easy marching distance of Chandragiri, he never advanced so far north. The place remained in the hands of Abdul Wahab, the Nawab’s brother, though Coote seems to have been unaware of either its importance or the killadar’s relationship to Muhammed Ali. There is strong reason to suspect that Abdul Wahab had, before the war, entered into treasonable correspondence with the Mysore court, for letters were sent from Chittoor to Seringapatam before the invasion, and a vakil from the killadar was seen in Haidar’s camp soon after he entered the Carnatic. Haidar at that time appeared dissatisfied with Abdul Wahab’s conduct, for a threatening message was returned through the vakil, prompting his master to abandon Chittoor and fortify himself at Chandragiri.
In January 1782, Haidar was able to undertake the reduction of this fort, and Abdul Wahab submitted without a struggle, though he had ample means to sustain a defence. Haidar agreed to let him retire with his family and goods to Madras, but as soon as the fort was surrendered, alleging some earlier breach of faith by the killadar, treacherously sent his whole family as prisoners to Seringapatam, retaining his two young daughters at Arcot.
During the remainder of 1782 the theatre of war shifted west and south. Though the English suffered a notable defeat at Tanjore, Haidar grew far from satisfied with the general situation and resolved to concentrate his forces and move to the Western Coast. Before departing, however, he ordered the destruction of most of the minor posts still in his possession on the Coromandel and had the defences of Arcot undermined. Just days before the mines were ready to be sprung, his despondency was relieved by the arrival of a French armament at Pondicherry. He hurried off to meet it, and the united forces, early in 1782, captured Cuddalore and Peramukkal.
Sir Eyre Coote was deeply chagrined at the loss of these two places, pronouncing the state of affairs not merely embarrassing but desperate. He resolved to try the result of a general battle and advanced for that purpose to Wandiwash, where Flint had for some days been surrounded by the combined allied armies. At Coote’s approach the enemy retreated to Pondicherry, whither the English army followed; but the Commander-in-Chief, unwilling to risk a battle against superior numbers far from his headquarters, resolved instead to make a move that would draw the enemy from their ground, and marched to Arni, by then the chief depot of the Mysore army in the Carnatic.
Lieutenant Flint had for some time been in secret treaty with the killadar there, who had agreed to allow the fort to be taken by surprise. Coote placed no full reliance on the promise, but reasoned that even should it prove false, an attack on Haidar’s depot would offer a chance to engage the enemy on more equal terms.
On 1 June the army moved to within a few miles of Arni. Tipu, detached by his father with a strong reinforcement, was not far behind, and on the morning of the 2nd, as the English army renewed its advance, a distant cannonade opened from various points on its rear. Unable to determine the precise direction from which an attack might come, the troops were engaged all day in a series of fatiguing manoeuvres, gaining nothing beyond the capture of one gun and eleven ammunition tumbrils. Coote eventually secured the camping ground he had intended to occupy that morning, but not before Haidar had dexterously detached a portion of his troops under Tipu, who succeeded in removing the treasure and stores from the fort. This achieved, the Mysore army withdrew.
On the 3rd, Coote made arrangements as if to lay siege to the fort, hoping the killadar might still fulfil his engagement, but Haidar’s proximity prevented any treachery, and on the 4th Coote abandoned the plan, advancing against an enemy who invariably retreated. On the 8th a skilful ambush, planned by Haidar, entrapped and surrounded the grand guard — commanded by a zealous but inexperienced young officer — with a hundred and sixty-six men and two guns captured. His repeated challenges to battle having been declined, Coote retired for a time to Wandiwash to rest his troops, then withdrew to Madras, and was forced to resign his command owing to his health. Major-General Stuart, next in seniority, succeeded him.
Haidar’s own health had also failed that year, and on 7 December 1782 he died in camp at Narasingarayanipet near Chittoor, where a small monument still marks the spot. His death was strictly concealed, his body sent secretly to his father’s tomb at Kolar, while Tipu was urged by express messengers to join the army without delay. Rumours of Haidar’s death, despite the attempt at concealment, spread widely, and the commandant at Vellore reported the fact as reliable as early as 9 December, only two days after it occurred. General Stuart, however, persisted in refusing to credit the rumour, adding that even if true, “the army would be ready to move in proper time.” No movement was in fact made for sixty days after Haidar’s death.
Battles with Tipu
The golden opportunity for delivering a crushing blow while the Mysore army was in consternation, and before the heir apparent had returned, was thus lost, and the campaign dragged on for four months. When the army finally moved, it advanced with the utmost deliberation to Karanguli and Wandiwash, whose fortifications were destroyed under instructions from the Presidency — a measure Coote had been particularly anxious to avoid, and one General Stuart himself later regretted having acquiesced in.
While near Wandiwash, an attempt was made to bring on a general action, but Tipu declined battle and, soon after, hearing of alarming British movements on the Western Coast, withdrew from the Carnatic. Before leaving he demolished two sides of the Arcot fortifications and destroyed every other important post he held in the country, save Arni, where he left a garrison. General Stuart had an excellent opportunity to secure Arcot: arriving there on his march, he found it abandoned by its garrison, but contented himself with sending word to Mahommed Murad at Vellore to come and take possession as killadar. Before Murad could occupy the fort, however, one Sultan Jung, a risaldar of the enemy, entered it with a large force.
Mahommed Murad contented himself with employing the thousand recruits he had enlisted in reducing both the upper and lower forts of Satghur.
It was expected that the veteran Coote would return from Bengal in April 1783 to resume command of the Madras army. He arrived on the 24th, but the improvement his health had shown during the sea voyage to Calcutta had been undone by the anxiety and exposure of his return journey, when the vessel in which he sailed narrowly escaped capture by French warships. He landed greatly weakened, and died two days later.
General Stuart was thus confirmed in command, and conducted some highly unsatisfactory operations against the French near Cuddalore. Fortunately, the European war was ended by a peace between the two nations, and General Stuart, recalled to Madras, was placed under arrest for incapacity and contempt of the Presidency’s authority, and eventually sent back to England.
Analysis of Eyre Coote’s Engagements
In January 1782, Vellore again needed revictualling, and Sir Eyre Coote, though about to resign and in poor health, determined to undertake its relief in person. A little beyond Tripassur his servants found him, on the 5th, insensible in his tent from an attack of apoplexy. The Madras Government, alive to the great risk to his life, urged that he be sent down to the Presidency; their astonishment was considerable when they learned he had set out the following day in a palanquin for Vellore, which he relieved on the 9th, and greater still when he returned safely to Madras soon after, Haidar having been unwilling to risk a battle.
There then followed an open rupture, long brewing, between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney, arising from alleged interference with Coote’s authority as Commander-in-Chief not only of Madras but of all India. The ensuing correspondence was marked by much irritating personality and insinuation, and the resulting lack of cordiality contributed not a little to the ill-success attending Sir Eyre Coote’s operations in South and North Arcot in the middle of the year.
Learning that Tipu, then commanding a separate force before Wandiwash, had suddenly decamped, and correctly surmising his intention was to intercept reinforcements then on their way from Bengal, in the same manner he had cut off Colonel Baillie, Sir Eyre hurried up the coast through Chingleput and the Mount to circumvent him. Tipu prepared ambushes and erected works on the road between Madras and Nellore, west of the Pulicat Lake, but forgot that the coast could still be marched along despite the inlets connecting the lagoons to the sea, which could be forded. Sir Eyre thus slipped past him unobserved on the far side of the lake and joined forces from the north, adding nearly a third to his army’s strength.
The British commander then marched to reduce Tripassur, thirty-three miles from Madras on the Arcot road, using Poonamallee, already retaken, as a supply base. He appeared before it on 19 August and, on the 22nd, was preparing to storm a breach when offers of capitulation on terms were made; a refusal had already been given when Haidar’s army was discovered marching to its relief. Not a moment was lost — the storming party was ordered forward and was actually leaving the trenches when the place surrendered, and Haidar drew off.
In the interval, Haidar had re-established himself in his lucky camp at Musarvakam. Following the superstitious feeling that drew him back there, he resolved to try conclusions with Sir Eyre Coote in a battle at Pullalur, on the same ground that had witnessed his great success the previous year, choosing the same Muslim date, the eleventh of Ramzan — which that year corresponded to 31 August. His astrologers predicted a complete victory, and he left nothing undone by way of ground study and temporary works to make failure impossible.
The British left Tripassur on the 26th and reached Perambakam the same day. About nine in the morning of the 27th, the advanced guard found themselves on the same ground where Colonel Baillie had made his fatal halt on the night of 9 September 1780. The enemy soon appeared advancing in front and on both flanks. The fight continued for several hours, at the end of which Sir Eyre Coote, by seizing the village of Pullalur with his first line, turned the enemy’s left flank — a success he followed up by rolling back Haidar’s right flank with his second line, forcing a retreat. The British encamped that night on the ground abandoned by the Mysore troops, though the latter claimed it as a drawn battle. The British force of eleven thousand men suffered only four hundred and twenty-one casualties; the enemy lost two thousand out of a total force of eighty thousand.
Death of Haidar Ali
The rest of 1782 was barren of major events. Haidar’s attention turned chiefly to the campaign in Malabar, which he had entrusted to Tipu. Haidar had for some time been in failing health, and the news of his death from a carbuncle at Vellore on 7 December 1782 came as a surprise to all parties.
It was at first kept a profound secret by his ministers, Purnaiya and Kishan Rao, to give Tipu time to arrive and assume the sovereignty, but the fact leaked out in various ways and reached the Madras Government. They urged the new Commander-in-Chief, General Stuart, to exploit the confusion an attack on the Mysore camp would cause, but he refused in a most unaccountable way, likely a feeble echo of his predecessor’s resistance to what he deemed outside dictation.
Haidar’s death on 7 December 1782 brought no end to military operations, which continued in a different form on the West Coast, drawing Tipu’s attention away from the Coromandel, where Said Sahib was left to cooperate with the French while the Sultan himself attended to his interests in the west.
Conclusion of the Second Mysore War
News of peace in Europe led to a convention for the cessation of hostilities between M. Bussy and General Stuart on 2 July 1783; but the conflict with Tipu continued until 11 March 1784, when a nominal peace ensued that lasted up to the war of 1790 — brought about chiefly by Tipu’s attack on Travancore, which the British held themselves bound to defend.
Haidar Ali died in 1782, and the war was continued by his son, Tipu Sultan. Sir Eyre Coote ended the war inconclusively at the Treaty of Mangalore, signed on 11 March 1784, under which the status quo ante was restored, and the Company was not in a position to claim a foot of Salem soil.
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