Tipu Sultan and the Third Anglo-Mysore War: Complete History

At the end of December 1789, Tipu Sultan, son of Haidar Ali, attacked the Travancore Lines and was beaten off. In April 1790 he carried them by storm, and thus began the Third Mysore War. The English formed an alliance with the Marathas and the Nizam to curb Tipu’s aggressiveness.

The war opened on the English side with a double attack: one under Colonel Kelly, advancing from the centre of the Coromandel through the Baramahal, and the other under General Medows from Trichinopoly, operating first against Dindigul and Coimbatore. The latter met with much opposition, Tipu himself assuming command and fighting several severe actions.

Medows’ Campaigns and the Struggle Against Tipu’s Tactics

The first stage of the war was mostly confined to operations in Coimbatore and Salem. General Medows left Trichinopoly on 26 May, seized Karur on 15 June, and proceeded to reduce the fortresses scattered over Coimbatore one by one. Coimbatore itself was occupied without resistance on 21 July; Erode fell on 6 August, and Dindigul on the 23rd.

A force was sent against Palghat, and another against a body of four thousand horse Tipu had posted in the country for observation; this force was driven up the Gajalhatti Pass, and Sathyamangalam was surprised and taken. But these operations had split Medows’ army into three divisions, between Palghat, Coimbatore, and Sathyamangalam. Tipu, hitherto inactive, now began to move: on 2 September, at the head of forty thousand men, he left Seringapatam, passed south through the Gajalhatti Pass on the 11th, and crossed the Bhavani river on the 12th. The moves and counter-moves of the following days compelled Medows to fall back from the Bhavani line to Coimbatore.

Meanwhile Tipu marched on Erode, which was evacuated at his approach on 25 September, recovering several places previously taken and inflicting several minor reverses on the British.

Maxwell’s Advances

Meanwhile a second English field force, nine thousand five hundred strong, had concentrated at Arni under Colonel Kelly. On 24 September that officer died, and command passed to Colonel Maxwell.

As soon as Tipu heard of Maxwell’s advance, he set out post-haste for the Baramahal; by 9 November his light cavalry had reached Kaveripatnam, and on the 11th the only regiment of British cavalry, allowing itself to be drawn into pursuit through a defile, was attacked by roughly six times its own number and driven back with considerable loss.

On the 12th the Sultan showed his full army and attempted, through various manoeuvres, to find a way to attack Colonel Maxwell to advantage; but Maxwell’s strong position, his admirable dispositions, and his readiness in anticipating every design frustrated these intentions, and the Sultan drew off at night without any serious attempt. The same manoeuvres were repeated on the 13th and 14th, with similar results, though on the 14th the numbers were further augmented — a demonstration actually intended to conceal Tipu’s planned departure the following day.

Later in the year, on receiving news of the invasion of the Baramahal, the Sultan crossed the Kaveri northward, leaving a quarter of his army under Kamr-u-din to watch General Medows, who crossed into Salem below Erode to relieve Colonel Maxwell — who, following Colonel Kelly’s death on 24 September, had assumed command of the other division.

In conformity with orders from General Medows, Maxwell entered the Baramahal on 24 October, in pursuance of the original campaign plan, and on 1 November approached Krishnagiri, the capital and strongest post in the district. The natural strength and improved defences of this formidable rock made it worth determining whether a regular siege should be attempted, and several days were spent in a close examination of its whole circumference. Colonel Maxwell then established his headquarters near the central position of Kaveripatnam, intending, by demonstrations toward the pass and the nearby fort, to return and attempt Krishnagiri by surprise.

Medows in Pursuit of Tipu

Meanwhile Medows had started in pursuit of Tipu, having crossed the Kaveri on 8 November and begun his march from the river on the 10th. On the 14th he encamped at the southern end of the Thopur Pass, and on the 15th, thanks to road improvements made by the Sultan a few days earlier, was able to clear the pass and the range of hills, encamping on their northern face on elevated ground overlooking the Baramahal, about twenty-nine miles from Colonel Maxwell’s position at Kaveripatnam. Here a camp was spotted six miles away.

As the advanced guard reached the intended ground, they saw a camp gradually taking shape, flags being raised, and troops taking up position on the plain about six miles off. Since nearly three weeks had passed without direct word from Colonel Maxwell, it was assumed the English army had found its comrades, and three signal guns were fired to announce the event. Within five minutes every tent had been struck, and heavy columns were seen marching west into the vale of the great Palakad pass — it was soon understood to be the Sultan’s own army.

He had drawn off some miles south of Colonel Maxwell’s position the previous evening and, calculating that General Medows would need another day to clear the pass, had pitched a camp he now found it prudent to abandon. General Medows moved on the 16th fifteen miles further toward Kaveripatnam and, the following day, realised he was in sight of Tipu’s army; he did not give pursuit, judging his junction with Maxwell more important. This was achieved on the 17th at Pula-halli, twelve miles south of Kaveripatnam.

The united army now stood twenty miles from the head of the Thopur Pass and twenty-six from its southern end. Kishen Rao, the treasurer, alone was admitted to the Sultan’s councils at this point. Though he had no fixed view on the English plan of operations after the disruption of their chain of depots, he inferred that wherever the Sultan went, they would follow, and that the Sultan should therefore carry the war into their own country, while keeping open the chance to recover lost ground. If followed up the vale of Palakad, the terrain left him no alternative but to ascend the ghat, so he resolved to double back through the Thopur Pass. His cattle had been much overworked on the 15th, and he judged it necessary to rest them two full days. His intelligence suggested the English general meant to halt on the day following the junction, but if such an intention existed, it had since changed.

The two armies were accordingly in motion on the 18th, both heading for the Thopur Pass and both intending to clear it in two easy marches. Tipu had decided to double back through the pass and try his fortune in the Carnatic. The two armies were actually preparing to encamp within four miles of one another before either discovered the other’s presence; Tipu’s columns had already entered the pass by the time the main body of the English army reached its camping ground.

Colonel Stuart, who commanded the right wing and led the column, perceiving from a commanding position the chance of cutting off a considerable body of the Sultan’s infantry and attacking the rest to advantage while entangled in the pass, reported his observations and asked leave to attempt it with his own wing as an advanced corps, to be supported as needed.

The proposal was not approved, and the corps on the right under General Medows, hampered by ravines, made slow progress. The demonstrations continued, and the value of a faster advance was borne out when three battalions of infantry in the rear of the main column were intercepted despite all these delays, and forced into a straggling retreat through the ravines and woods in the opposite direction. The rest of the Sultan’s army, astonished at their good fortune, cleared the pass entirely, losing only one broken-down tumbril and some minor military stores. The cavalry disappeared about sunset, a small body taking the pass route and the remainder circling round via Pennagaram; the English army, after a tedious twenty-mile march of about fifteen hours and firing a few shots, encamped that night near the summit of the Thopur Pass.

It was a golden opportunity to cut off a portion of the enemy’s infantry and attack the rest while entangled in the pass. Medows let the chance slip. Tipu’s army cleared the pass, except for three infantry battalions in the rear of the main column, which were intercepted and forced to retreat in the opposite direction, and the majority of the cavalry, which disappeared toward Pennagaram and rejoined the main body by a roundabout route some days later. Tipu pressed on without halting for Trichinopoly, and Medows’ campaign was rendered fruitless.

As the Quartermaster-General’s department, under cover of the advanced guard, prepared to mark out the new encampment, a few tents were spotted three or four miles ahead on the right — Tipu’s Pesh Khana, the tents always sent ahead for his personal accommodation with the advanced guard. Confident in his equipment, the Sultan rashly decided to continue his march through the pass.

By the time the head of the main English column reached the intended encampment, thick clouds of dust ahead marked the entry of a long, heavy column into the pass, while a considerable body of horse made a demonstration on the right, seemingly masking a movement of infantry suggested by dust columns to their rear-left — though careful observers judged these were actually returning westward. The General moved out with a brigade of infantry and the cavalry to examine this body, while the main column was ordered to regulate its advance by that of the corps he was directing.

To anyone familiar with the terrain over which this retreat was conducted, General Medows’ failure to harass and destroy the enemy while entangled in the pass appears open to criticism. Every advantage lay with a pursuer, since for nearly six miles the fugitives would have been exposed to near-vertical fire they could not effectively return. Colonel Stuart’s assessment appears to have been correct, and even had Medows feared danger to his right and rear from the body that later escaped toward Pennagaram, he had ample means to guard against that risk without weakening his main body enough to impair the pursuit through the pass.

There is even less excuse for this omission, since Medows had himself marched through the pass not long before and must have known the advantage it offered to a pursuing force.

On the Sultan’s side, the English advanced guard was discovered in time for the baggage, camp equipage, and rear-guard to withdraw, separated from the army by the whole of the British forces; the dust of their retreat contributed to the English general’s hesitation. The Sultan himself was present with the cavalry that made the demonstration on the right, and rode off with a light escort through the pass shortly before it disappeared. The Pesh Khana was the only shelter available to the whole army, and all were without provisions until joined by Kamr-u-din and his small bazaar two days later.

Tipu, however, made no delay, his army living off the plunder of his own villages; feinting toward Karur and giving out that he would cross the Kaveri below that place, he descended along the northern bank of the river and made no halt until opposite Trichinopoly. Against that place he made various demonstrations, though with no material result beyond the plunder and devastation of the island of Srirangam.

General Medows was now called to Madras to meet Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, who arrived there on 12 December; and Tipu, foiled at Trichinopoly, marched, laying waste as he advanced, through the Coromandel via Tiagardurgam and Tiruvannamalai, and thence by Permacoil toward Pondicherry.

Still, with the exception of Krishnagiri, everything essential to communication with the Coromandel and the Baramahal to the south-east and east was already secured, and Lord Cornwallis felt free to turn his attention to the north-east, where Nandidrug was captured on 19 October. The Governor-General’s absence in that direction suggested to the Sultan the advantage of a diversion elsewhere, and Lord Cornwallis was again called south-east by an alarm for his communications.

The Campaign of Cornwallis

After Lord Cornwallis arrived in Madras, the English had a definite objective: Seringapatam. The Governor-General concentrated his forces at Vellore on 10 February.

The Governor-General had reached Vellore on 11 February 1791 and was threatening the Baramahal through the Ambur Pass when the Sultan, learning this, marched hastily via Chengam and Palakod to meet him — and, had the attack come by the anticipated route, would have been in time to forestall it. But the feint on Ambur had concealed the true plan, which was to ascend via the Mugli Pass, whence the English troops advanced by way of Kolar and Hoskote on Bangalore, which was stormed on 21 March.

Cornwallis had feigned an invasion of the Baramahal. On the 28th, Kolar fell; Bangalore was stormed on 21 March, and by 4 May Cornwallis had started for Seringapatam, but returned to Bangalore owing to the onset of the rains. By July he had begun a series of operations for the reduction of Tipu’s outlying forts.

Lord Cornwallis, after making the requisite arrangements at Bangalore, where Captain Read’s talent and military skill had succeeded in bringing forward the most important supplies without loss — though greatly interrupted by enemy detachments — moved south-east to Hosur, which was evacuated and imperfectly demolished on his approach; fortunately a mine laid for the magazine, intended to explode after the entry of English troops, failed to go off. He then moved toward the passes of Palakad and Rayakota to reduce the cluster of hill-forts commanding access to these passes from above and below.

Hosur, Anchettidurgam, Nilagiri, and Ratnagiri were taken without resistance. Under Major Gowdie, the lower fort of Rayakota was stormed on 20 July, and the upper fort surrendered two days later; at the same time, Hudedurgam and other small hill-forts capitulated. Garrisons were placed at Rayakota, Anchettidurgam, and Hudedurgam, and the other places dismantled. In September the British turned their efforts to reducing the country north of Bangalore.

Possession of these posts would open a free line of supply from the Coromandel and protect the Company’s possessions from the inroads of small cavalry divisions, by occupying all the direct roads from Seringapatam to the Baramahal. An advanced brigade under Major Gowdie saw sharp fighting at Rayakota, the chief of these hill-forts, garrisoned by eight hundred men.

He forced the lower works shortly before daylight by blowing open a gate, hoping to carry the rock together with the fleeing defenders; he took several successive gates but found it imprudent to attempt the summit. Though instructed to withdraw if his first attempt did not fully succeed, he judged there was a good chance of ultimate success and deviated from his orders far enough to hold his ground about halfway up the hill, and the place capitulated on the army’s arrival. The lesser posts, all capable of a protracted defence, offered varying but unsuccessful degrees of resistance; some, favoured by the local terrain, withstood the assault, and their garrisons escaped by the opposite descent into the woods.

His lordship also considered some arrangement for blockading Krishnagiri, capital of the Baramahal — a place deemed impregnable by regular means, which, though it commanded no road, was capable, with a large garrison, of interrupting the passage of convoys — but he was called away from this area by circumstances not entirely unforeseen.

In October 1791, a diversion was caused in the Baramahal by one Bakir Sahib, son of the venerable Killedar of Dharwar, who descended with a force into Coimbatore and entered the Baramahal by the Toppur Pass. Colonel Maxwell was sent against him. The raiders had ensconced themselves and their captives in the fort of Pennagaram; Colonel Maxwell appeared before it on 31 October and called on the garrison to surrender.

In reply the flag of truce was fired upon. Of the garrison, two hundred men were killed. Bakir Sahib, soon finding the Baramahal untenable, retired via Chengam to the Coromandel.

Maxwell then proceeded to Krishnagiri and seized the Peta by surprise on 7 November. He soon afterward rejoined the main army and again prepared for the march on Seringapatam. Tipu was brought to his knees before the end of February, and a peace was ratified on 19 March that stripped Tipu of half his dominions and burdened him with a fine of over thirty million rupees. By this treaty, the whole of Salem District except Hosur Taluk came under Company rule.

A force under the said Bakir Sahib, an active young officer and son of the venerable killadar of Dharwar, had been detached by way of Coimbatore and Thopur into the Baramahal, with a substantial reinforcement for Krishnagiri, with orders to act against the English army’s communications and, in particular, to sweep off the population and cattle of the whole district to the south.

Colonel Maxwell, with a suitable division of the army, was sent to disperse these intruders, and, descending the ghat, learned that part of the enemy had proceeded to carry off the population to Pennagaram, a post in the angle formed by the main mountain range and the cross chain of Thopur, from which only a mountain pass leads further south. He moved rapidly in that direction and demanded the surrender of the place by regular summons, but the enemy, not content with a simple refusal, fired upon the flag.

Given this, prompt measures were justified; the place was instantly assaulted and carried by escalade with little loss to the attackers, though two hundred of the garrison were killed before the troops’ anger could be restrained, and the cavalry escaped by mountain paths. The rapidity of Colonel Maxwell’s movements, informed by the local knowledge he had gained in the previous campaign, soon forced Bakir Sahib to withdraw from a country too confined for the safe operation of cavalry. He descended by the pass of Chengama into the Coromandel, but, finding from the presence of English cavalry under Colonel Floyd that any move on Madras would be hazardous, turned south and re-entered the Mysore dominions by the Attur Pass.

Analysis of Colonel Maxwell’s Engagements

Colonel Maxwell had been ordered, if he judged the venture advisable, to attempt the destruction of the town within the lower fort of Krishnagiri, so as to deprive the enemy as far as possible of cover for their raiding activities. Having achieved his objectives elsewhere in the province, he encamped on 7 November within a few miles of the place, giving no sign of his intent beyond reascending the pass. He moved at ten that night in three divisions and carried the lower fort by escalade. The officers commanding each division were instructed, if conditions were favourable, to follow up the blow and ascend the rock with the fleeing defenders, who barely had time to shut and barricade the gate; the pursuit was so close that a standard of the regular troops was taken on the very steps of the gateway.

The ladder-bearers, however, were not as quick in their ascent, and the garrison, more numerous than their assailants, began hurling down granite missiles. Rock outcrops gave the attackers some cover, and repeated attempts over two hours were made to apply ladders, which were as often crushed along with those who carried them, until Colonel Maxwell was forced to abandon the assault, with considerable loss. The garrison sallied out during the British retreat, but with such discipline on the British side that they quickly returned. After setting fire to the town, the English troops withdrew before daylight and soon returned to headquarters, having moved along the back of the range between the passes of Palakod and Peddanaikandurgam, restoring a number of minor posts to the families of their former Hindu possessors.

The remaining operations culminated in the siege of Seringapatam and the treaty of 1792, by which, among other territorial cessions, the whole of the present district of Salem, except Hosur Taluk, passed to the English, giving the Coromandel the second line of ghats as a firm boundary on the west, with its frontier fortress of Rayakota on the Mysore tableland.

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